Deep learning has achieved impressive results in many areas of Computer Vision and Natural Language Processing. Among others, Visual Question Answering (VQA), also referred to a visual Turing test, is considered one of the most compelling problems, and recent deep learning models have reported significant progress in vision and language modeling. Although Artificial Intelligence (AI) is getting closer to passing the visual Turing test, at the same time the existence of adversarial examples to deep learning systems may hinder the practical application of such systems.
Introduction
Machine learning, especially deep learning, has achieved great success in various application scenarios, such as image classification, speech recognition, and machine translation. Recent advancements in Computer Vision and Natural Language Processing have led to deep learning-based Artificial Intelligence (AI) agents that can handle open-domain visual question answering problems.
Visual Question Answering (VQA) is a task where the goal is to answer a natural language question based on an image. The VQA problem is often referred to as a visual Turing test. A VQA system enables human beings to interact with a computer-based system, which can be applied in many scenarios such as smart home management systems, private virtual assistant, and autonomous driving systems. Recent work has made significant progress on tackling VQA [9] , [18] . While promising, these applications 1 Work was done during a visit at UC Berkeley. Figure 1 : Adversarial example can successfully "fool" the visual question answering (VQA) system to predict the incorrect answer "red" to the question "What color is the traffic light?". also may have severe security implications, and thus it is important to ensure the security of these machine learningbased systems before they are widely adopted.
However, recent studies prove the existence of adversarial examples in many vision-based learning models, which may hinder the adoption of deep learning techniques to these security-sensitive applications [13] , [30] , [40] , [47] . Most existing works consider image classification and demonstrate that it is almost always possible to fool these models to classify an adversarially generated image as a class specified by the adversary. It appears that most studied deep learning models do not have any mechanism to prevent adversarial examples. On the other hand, models which include a language modality, as the VQA models do, may have the potential to use the learned language models to improve resilience against adversarial examples. Therefore, it is important to investigate whether these models also suffer from adversarial examples.
In this work, we examine whether a VQA model that can perform well on a visual Turing test can also be fooled by adversarial examples. In particular, we consider white-box targeted adversarial examples; that is, given a questionanswer pair as the target, can we generate an adversarial image such that the victim VQA model, whose parameters and architecture are known, will produce the target answer for the target question and adversarial image pair as input? For example, Figure 1 shows a benign (unmodified) image and an adversarial image. In particular, when given the question "What color is the traffic light", the VQA system can predict the correct answer "green" on the original image, but "red" on the adversarially generated image which appears identical to the original benign one to a human observer. This example demonstrates a case that may lead to a severe traffic rule violation, which may result in a car accident if the system is employed by the autonomous driving system.
In this work, we provide an extensive study of adversarial examples for the state-of-the-art VQA models. Our studies reveal several interesting phenomena. First, if the target question-answer pair appears frequently, and they match each other, i.e., the answer is meaningful to the question regardless of the input image, then it is almost always possible to generate adversarial examples for the VQA system. Second, our evaluation shows that the adversarial examples can transfer between different models, and thus black-box attacks may be plausible. These findings show that VQA systems are vulnerable to adversarial examples, and highlight the importance of developing defense strategies against adversarial examples.
However, when the question-answer pair does not appear frequently, or the question and the answer do not match each other at all, then it is hard to find targeted adversarial examples. We evaluate Carlini's state-of-the-art adversarial example generation algorithm [5] , as well as an improved algorithm that we develop, and find that these algorithms fail at generating targeted adversarial examples when the target question-answer pair satisfies these properties.
In our investigation, we find that a language prior is the most likely the reason to cause this effect. That is, when given a particular question (i.e., the target question), the model is likely to take the question into consideration, and so it always responds with an answer that makes sense to the question. When given a rare question-answer pair, or the question and answer that do not match each other, the model will likely down-score such a target answer.
Such a phenomenon is more prominent when the neural network model contains an explicit reasoning mechanism for question answering. In particular, in our evaluation, we examine two models, denoted as MCB [9] and NMN [18] . MCB is a bilinear fusion model, which combines an image and a question representations to predict an answer. NMN is a compositional model which builds a question-dependent network layout and processes an image with this network to predict an answer. Our experimental results show that NMN is somewhat harder to attack than MCB. These findings shed new light on a future design of neural network architectures to be resilient against adversarial examples.
In this work, we mostly focus on white-box adversaries. In fact, recent work from Madry et al. demonstrates promising results that show that building a resilient defense strategy against white-box attackers can be done by developing strong white-box attacks through adversarial retraining [33] . Thus, we focus on generating adversarial examples in the white-box setting and consider building a resilient VQA model as an important future work. Here, we demonstrate that the targeted adversarial examples can transfer between VQA models, and leave it as future work to generate blackbox attacks.
We summarize our contributions as follows:
1) We present the first extensive study of targeted adversarial examples on VQA models that performs well on the visual Turing test; 2) We develop a novel algorithm to generate adversarial examples, and show that it can outperform the previous state-of-the-art attacks; 3) Our evaluation shows that targeted adversarial examples exist for VQA models when the target question-answer pairs appear frequently and have sensible meanings and also shows that targeted adversarial examples can transfer across different VQA models. 4) Our evaluation reveals the language prior phenomenon which makes some target questionanswer pairs hard to effectively attack using existing adversarial example generation algorithms; 5) We also show that a compositional neural module network provides slightly more resilience against adversarial examples than a non-compositional model. Our findings highlight the potential of developing robust models which employ even more modalities in the neural network architecture design.
Background
In this section, we provide background for visual question answering (VQA) and discuss the prominent approaches to this task. We then introduce the state-of-the-art approaches to generating adversarial examples.
Visual Question Answering (VQA)
In recent years, numerous new tasks involving both vision and language have emerged. One popular vision and language task is visual question answering (VQA). Given an image and a natural language question as an input, the goal of VQA is to predict a natural language answer. VQA can be used in assistive systems so that visually impaired people can know about visual scenes by asking questions and receiving answers from VQA. VQA is also referred to as a visual Turing test, and several benchmarks have been proposed in the literature [3] , [21] . Recent works have developed deep neural networks to achieve great progress on the VQA task. In the following, we briefly introduce the typical non-compositional and compositional approaches.
Non-compositional approaches. A typical representative of an end-to-end non-compositional approach is e.g. the MCB model proposed in [9] . Given an image input I and an question input Q, a typical VQA model first uses two neural networks f 1 and f 2 to convert I and Q into embeddings u i = f 1 (I) and u q = f 2 (Q). Two popular examples of f 1 and f 2 are ResNet [15] and LSTM [17] .
Then a multimodal fusion operator F (e.g. concatenation) is used to combine u i and u q together, i.e., u = F 1 (u i , u q ). Next many VQA models use u to compute the attention map, i.e., a = softmax(N 1 (u)).
The attention map provides the weight information, i.e. which part of the image the VQA model should pay more attention to, conditioning on the input image and question. For example, in the original image of Figure 1 , given the question "What color is the traffic light?" and the image, the locations around the green light in the image is more relevant for answering the question, and thus the weights around the green light area should have higher values in the attention map. Then, the input image u i is converted into another embedding u i = u i ⊗ a, where ⊗ is an operator (e.g., weighted sum) to apply the attention map over an embedding.
Finally, u i (optionally combined again with the question u q [9] ) is used to produce the final answer. In particular, a VQA model typically considers only the top-K most frequent answers (e.g., K = 3000), and thus the problem can be considered as a K-class classification problem. That is, the prediction can be computed as argmax j (softmax(W u )), where W is a set of parameters.
Such an approach is non-compositional, since it relies on the same monolithic non-modular network structure for all input questions. We show next how a compositional approach uses different modules to compose the entire network.
Compositional approaches.
Recently, a number of compositional approaches to VQA have been proposed, e.g. [18] , which essentially generalize the approach described above. Notice, that we can view the model described above as a combination of two steps: first, it computes the representation u i based on the input image and the question; second, it predicts the answer based on u i and the question. For example, for the input of Figure 1 , the VQA model first uses the attention map to find "the traffic light" in the image; and then based on the result from the first step answers a "what color" question. Therefore, these two steps can be viewed as two operators, which are executed sequentially to predict the final answer.
A representative approach of Hu et al. [18] abstracts these different operators as 9 kinds of modules (e.g. find, compare), which may take arguments. For example, in Figure 1 , the embedding of "the traffic light" can be the argument of the find module in the first step. In such a model, the input question is first converted into a computation graph, where each node is a module with its arguments. Then the modules are executed in a topological order of the graph. Therefore, the network architectures in may vary given different questions, and all the networks are composed of modules shared across questions. Therefore, such an approach is compositional.
Adversarial Examples
In this section, we provide a generic framework to characterize adversarial examples. We define a machine learning model f θ as a function mapping an input instance x into an output y, i.e., f θ (x) = y. In this work, we focus on classification models, which means that y only takes values from a finite discrete set, which is typically referred to as the label set. Therefore, the output for an input instance is also called its label.
In this work, we consider generating targeted adversarial examples [5] , [30] . Given a benign input instance x, a targeted adversarial example is parameterized by a target label y target , which is typically different from the ground truth label of x. A targeted adversarial example x generated from the benign instance x with the target y target is defined as an instance satisfying
Here, d is a distance function, and the constraint d(x, x ) ≤ B models the intuition that two similar images (i.e., whose distance is not larger than a bound B) should have the same ground truth label. Searching for an instance satisfying constraint (1) is not an easy task. Almost all adversarial example generation algorithms convert (1) into its differentiable counterpart, and solve it as a continuous optimization problem. In doing so, off-the-shelf solvers, such as gradient descent-based algorithms, can be applied directly to efficiently find adversarial examples by solving the optimization problem.
In particular, assume f θ is a neural network, whose last layer outputs a distribution over all labels:
where K is the total number of labels in the label set, and J θ (x) i approximates the probability of f θ (x) = i. To find targeted adversarial examples, we can convert objective (1) into its differentiable counterpart as follows:
Objective (2) minimizes the distance between J θ (x ) and the target label y target , so as to maximize the probability that the model will predict y target as the output of x . The state-of-the-art Carlini's attack [5] further converts (2) into its dual form
where λ > 0 is a hyper-parameter whose value is determined through a grid search. This objective can be optimized directly using an optimizer, such as Adam [23] .
Transferability and Black-box Attacks
In this work, we focus on white-box adversarial examples, which means that the generation of these adversarial examples requires full knowledge of the model architectures. However, we also demonstrate that an adversary could likely generate black-box adversarial examples without such knowledge. This is possible due to the transferability of adversarial examples, i.e., their ability to transfer between different network architectures [30] , [37] , [40] , [48] .
Previous work demonstrates transferability between: (1) two models with the same architecture trained on different training data; (2) two models with different architectures trained on the same training data; and (3) Again, all these previous work only study image classification models. In this work, we are interested in the transferability of targeted adversarial examples between visionlanguage models, which we show below.
Threat model
In this section, we explain the threat model and the adversary's goal in generating adversarial examples.
White-box attacks. We assume that the attacker knows all details of the victim model. In particular, the attacker can compute the gradient of the model with respect to the input, which is used in most white-box adversarial example studies. This assumption may be stronger than real-world attackers, but as we discussed above, the attacker can rely on transferability to convert a white-box attack into a black-box attack. Further, a strong attacker is also helpful in building a strong defense strategy. Therefore, evaluating the attacker's strength in the white-box setting is important.
No defense deployed on the victim model. We also assume that the victim model does not employ any defense strate-gies. This does not hinder the practicality of our results. In fact, most existing defense proposals are either not properly evaluated and vulnerable to strong attacks, or only designed for black-box attacks (see Section 6 for a detailed discussion), and thus are not suitable for a white-box adversary. Madry et al. [33] propose so far the only white-box defense proposal that is demonstrated to be resilient against whitebox adversaries on a small dataset, called MNIST [28] . Since their defense approach requires significantly longer training time, and their performance on another slightly more complex dataset, CIFAR, is low, we leave evaluation of this defense strategy to future work.
Targeted adversarial examples. In this work, we only consider attackers who generate targeted adversarial examples. There are two reasons to prefer targeted adversarial examples over non-targeted ones. First, non-targeted adversarial examples may not indeed be threats. In particular, any input that can fool the model to predict a label which is not identical to the ground truth can be considered as a non-targeted adversarial example. However, this condition is over-conservative, since a non-targeted adversarial example may result in a similar, though not an identical prediction to its ground truth. In this case, a non-targeted adversarial example may not really constitute a threat. Second, a real adversary may prefer to delimit the target. For example, when the VQA system is employed in the autonomous driving system, the attacker may want to fool the system to answer "yes" when it is asked with the question "Is there a stop sign in front of the car?", so that the attacker can force the vehicle to stop. Any other answers may not achieve the adversary's goal. For these reasons, we consider only targeted adversarial examples.
A high attack success rate. We use the attack success rate to measure the success of an adversarial example generation algorithm. This is a standard metric used by most existing works [5] , [30] . Therefore, we consider the adversary whose goal is to maximize the attack success rate.
A high adversarial probability. Typically, the learning system will predict an answer along with a probability as its confidence score. The higher this probability is, the more confident the system believes in its answer. In the VQA problem, a successful targeted adversarial example may not necessarily have a high probability on the target answer, due to the large size of the answer set. In this case, the victim (e.g., human beings using the victim model) may become suspicious on the answer provided by the system if the probability is too low, and thus is more likely to detect the existence of the adversary. We consider attackers who want to achieve stealthiness and thus may want to maximize the probability of the target answer, a.k.a., adversarial probability. Notice that this is a metric that was not well considered before since most previous work consider classification models with small label sets that do not have this issue.
Bounded distance versus minimal distance. In this work, we treat equally all adversarial examples whose distances to the benign one are within the bound. This is also different from previous work, which focuses on finding adversarial examples with the minimal distance [5] . In fact, we argue that as long as the distance is within a properly set bound, the visual difference between an adversarial example and a benign one is indistinguishable even by humans, and thus it is unnecessary to find the closest one. On the other hand, adversarial examples with larger distances may enjoy better transferability [30] , and also can be used by adversarial retraining to improve the model's resilience. Therefore, in this work, we do not require the distance between an adversarial example and its benign origin to be minimal.
Generating Targeted Adversarial Examples For VQA Models
In this section, we present our approach to generating targeted adversarial examples against a VQA model. We first explain the setup of the model and some terminology, and provide a formal definition of targeted adversarial examples for VQA models.
We then present a novel approach derived from Carlini's state-of-the-art attack [5] . Our design is inspired by two goals discussed in Section 2.4: (1) maximizing the probability of the target answer, which is equivalent to the confidence that the model believes in its prediction; and (2) removing the preference of adversarial examples with smaller distance to the benign one, as long as this distance is small enough (i.e., below an upper bound). Our evaluation shows that our algorithm performs slightly better than [5] in terms of maximizing the adversarial probability.
VQA models and targeted adversarial examples
We denote a VQA model as f θ (I, Q), where θ is the parameters of the model, I is the input image, and Q is the input question. The output f θ (I, Q) is the predicted answer to the question Q given the image I.
Most existing VQA models consider this task as a classification problem. That is, they choose the most probable answer among the top-K most frequent answers in the training set (or both training and testing set). Typically, stateof-the-art VQA models use K = 3000.
We consider that the target to a VQA model f θ is a question-answer pair (Q target , A target ), and a targeted adversarial example is an image I adv such that
where we refer to I ori as the benign image.
A neural network-based VQA model f θ can also be represented as f θ (I, Q) = argmax i J θ (I, Q), where J θ (I, Q) outputs a K-dimensional vector in which each dimension indicates the probability of corresponding choice to be the predicted answer. Therefore, we can generate adversarial examples by solving the following optimization problem
where I ori is a benign image, and the goal is to find an adversarial example I adv that is close to I ori . Typically, L is chosen as the same loss function for training the model, but other alternatives which are monotonic to the training loss can also be used. In particular, Carlini et al. show that the choice of different loss functions has a significant impact on the attack success rate [5] , when the attacks are evaluated on MNIST dataset [28] . In this work, we consider L to be the cross-entropy loss, which is equivalent to the best loss function used in [5] .
Solving the optimization problem
In this work, we propose a novel approach that can slightly improve the attack success rate over Carlini's attack.
In particular, we approximate the optimization problem using an alternative objective function as follows
In this formula, we use x to represent the input image. Thus the adversarial example is the value of x that minimizes the objective (5) . This objective has three components. The first component, L(J θ (x, Q target ), A target ), is the same as objective (3) . The latter two are the most important innovation in this work, and we elaborate their design in the following.
The second component. The second component is
It takes two hyperparameters, where λ 1 is used to balance this component and others, and A predict is the prediction of the original image. The value of A predict is set dynamically during the iterative optimization process, so that each iteration may choose a different value of A predict . We will explain this process in more details in the next subsection.
We set τ to be a constant, e.g., log(K) when L is chosen as the cross-entropy loss. This constant guarantees the second term is always non-negative, especially when 1(A target = A predict . In fact, we have the following theorem Theorem 1. Assuming τ = log K, where K is the number of output classes, L is the cross-entropy loss, i.e., L(u, i) = − log u i , the last layer of J is a softmax operator, and A predict is the prediction of the model over input image x and question Q target , i.e., argmax i J θ (x, Q target ), then we have
Proof. We consider two cases between the relationship between A target and A predict . First, when A target = A predict , the left-hand side of (6) is 0, and thus (6) is trivially true. Second, when A target = A predict , then the left-hand side of (6) becomes
Thus proving (6) is equivalent to prove
However, we assume the last layer of J is a softmax layer, and thus we have
which is a contradiction. Therefore, we conclude that Theorem 1 is true.
To understand how this component works, we consider two possible cases. First, in the case A predict = A target , the image generated in the last iteration is already an adversarial example, and thus this component is 0 since 1(A target = A predict ) = 0. In this case, optimizing objective (5) is equivalent to maximizing the probability of predicting the target answer A target .
Second, when A predict = A target , minimizing the second component is essentially maximizing L(J θ (x, Q target ), A predict ), which is equivalent to minimizing the probability of the model to predict A predict , which is different from the target answer A target . As for the value of the hyperparameter λ 1 , which is used to balance between this component and others, we find that setting λ 1 = 1 works the best in most cases. Notice that in this case, jointly optimizing the first and the second component is equivalent to optimizing the best loss function used in Carlini's attack.
The third component. The third component is set to enforce the constraint (4). In particular, ReLU(x) = max(0, x) is the rectifier function, and is a small positive hyper-parameter that we will explain later. When d(I adv , I ori ) ≤ B − < B, i.e., constraint (4) is satisfied, the third component is 0, and thus has no effective on the objective.
On the other hand, if an adversarial example I adv does not satisfy constraint (4), we show that it is never optimizing (5) when λ 2 is large enough. In fact, we have the following theorem.
the solution I adv minimizing the objective (5) satisfies constraint (4) as well. Proof. We prove this by contradiction. We assume an adversarial example I adv = I does not satisfy (4), but optimizes (5) . In this case, d(I adv , I ori ) > B > B − , and thus the ReLU function is activated and its output must be greater than . Thus, the third component is at least λ 2 . Since the other two components are also non-negative, therefore, the objective of (5) is at least λ 2 as well. On the other hand, we can set I adv = I ori , so that the value of objective
we have that setting I adv = I ori results in a lower value of objective (5) than I adv = I , which contradicts the assumption! In practice, we can set to be a small value (e.g., 2), and set λ 2 to be a large value (e.g., 10) , then the generated adversarial examples end up not activating the ReLU function (i.e., the output of the function is 0). Even when the ReLU function is activated, its value is not larger than , and thus the constraint (4) is still satisfied.
Notice that in most previous iterative optimization-based approaches [5] , [30] , optimizing (3) while satisfying constraint (4) is converted into a joint optimization problem of L(...) + λd(...), which minimizes both the lost function (3) and the distance function d(I adv , I ori ). The most prominent difference is that our approach does not minimize this distance as long as it is within the bound B.
Putting everything together
The overall adversarial generation method is presented in Algorithm 1. This algorithm takes the hyper-parameters defined above, along with η, representing the learning rate, and maxitr, representing the maximal number iterations that the algorithm runs.
In the algorithm, I 1 is initialized with a random starting point satisfying constraint (4) (line 1). Then the algorithm iteratively updates I i (lines 2-6). In each iteration, the prediction A predict is first computed (line 3). If this prediction already matches the target, and the algorithm has run for Algorithm 1 Targeted Adversarial Generation Algorithm
if A predict = A target and i > 50 then 5
at least 50 iterations, the algorithm stops and returns I i as a successful adversarial example (lines 4-5). Here, 50 is a hyperparameter that can be further tuned. In this work, we fix it to be 50 in all experiments. On the other hand, if the algorithm does not stop at line 5, then I i+1 will be updated based on the gradient ∇ x ξ(A predict ) and the learning rate η (line 6). Here, update can be any optimization algorithm. We evaluated the algorithm's performance by using SGD, Adam, or RMSProp, and found that Adam always yields the best attack success rate. Therefore, we use Adam as the update function through out this work. In the end, if it does not return at line 5 during some iteration, then the algorithm fails at finding an adversarial example, and it returns I maxitr+1 as a result. In our evaluation, we set η = 1.0 and maxitr = 1000 for evaluation.
Notice that Carlini et al. [5] also suggest running the optimization algorithm multiple times with different random starting points (i.e., line 1) to avoid local optima. We employ the same trick and pick the best adversarial example generated among different executions of Algorithm 1 as the final result.
Experiments on Adversarial Examples of VQA Models
We start by explaining the setup for the experiments and then present the quantitative and qualitative results. We then further investigate attention maps of the two VQA models in our studies to reveal how adversarial examples fool the model.
Setup
In this subsection, we will introduce two state-of-theart VQA models used in our evaluation, the datasets, the adversarial example generation algorithm, and the evaluation metrics used in this work. 4.1.1. Models. We experiment with two models for open-ended visual question answering, namely the MCB model [9] , which is the winner of the VQA challenge in 2016, and a compositional model called NMN [18] . Both models achieve similar performance on the VQA benchmark [3] , while their architectures are quite different. While MCB is a representative of non-compositional approaches to VQA, NMN is on the contrary a compositional model. It is an interesting study to compare such distinct models w.r.t their robustness to adversarial examples, and the transferability of adversarial examples between the two. We give a more detailed description about the models below in addition to our high-level introduction in Section 2.1.
MCB. The model of [9] is an end-to-end model, which encodes an image with state-of-the-art ResNet [15] features, and encodes a question with an LSTM [17] . The model of [9] relies on a new multimodal fusion method, specifically, they propose to use the Multimodal Compact Bilinear (MCB) pooling, where Compact Bilinear pooling was introduced by [11] . MCB pooling approximates an outer product between the two vector representations via the Count Sketch projections [6] . The proposed model also exploits a soft attention mechanism over the spatial image regions. The predicted attention weights are used to obtain a single visual feature vector, by computing a weighted sum over the visual features. The obtained visual representation is again combined with the question representation via the MCB pooling. The obtained vector is fed into a fully connected layer to get the final predictions, followed by a Softmax layer over the 3,000 most frequent answers from the training set of the VQA dataset. NMN. The model in [18] is a representative of compositional neural module networks (NMNs) [2] , [1] . Unlike these prior works, in [18] , Hu et al. learn to build the networks in an end-to-end manner by incorporating question parsing into the pipeline. First, they learn a layout prediction policy given a question; they predict the network layout and learn to associate each module with a part of the question via an attention mechanism. It is implemented as sequenceto-sequence learning: the words of the question as input and a linearized sequence of modules as output. Next, the obtained network is trained to predict an answer for a given image, while jointly learning the parameters for each module. Similar to the model of [9] , in [18] Hu et al. also frame the visual question answering as the classification problem on the VQA dataset.
Pretrained models. We retrieve the pre-trained model of MCB from their website 1 , and the pre-trained model of NMN by contacting the authors through email directly. The code implementing NMN is acquired from the website. 2 Notice that the MCB model is trained not only on the VQA dataset but also on the Visual Genome dataset [25] , while the NMN model only considers the VQA dataset. Both VQA models choose K = 3, 000, and thus ignore all answers that do not appear in the set of top-3, 000 most frequent answers. As their top-3, 000 answer sets are slightly different from each other, we ignore all answers that appear only in one of the two models' answer sets, and in the end, there are 2,861 answers left in our consideration.
We construct multiple attack datasets in our experiments. Each dataset contains a set of (I, Q, A) triples, where I is a benign image, and (Q, A) is a target question-answer pair. We explain how these triples are selected in different datasets below.
Gold-Standard. For this dataset, we manually create triples where the target question is meaningful to the image, and the target answer is incorrect to the question and image pairs. To achieve this goal, we randomly select 100 images. For each of them, we manually choose questions that are meaningful to the image, while both MCB and NMN models can answer correctly the questions based on the image. If none of such questions exist for an image, we replace it with another randomly selected image. We repeat this process until we get 100 question-image pairs where both models predict correct answers. Then, for each question-image pair, we manually choose an answer that makes sense for the question but is incorrect in the context of the image. In the end, we have 100 (I, Q, A) triples that constitute the Gold-Standard set.
Popular-QA. The Gold-Standard set contains only 100 triples, which may not provide the full insights about adversarial examples on VQA models. Therefore, we create four more datasets for scalable evaluation. Since it is harder to ensure that in each triple (I, Q, A), the target (Q, A) is indeed adversarial to the image I, these four datasets are mainly used to explore negative results (i.e. the targets which are hard for our adversarial example generation algorithm) and to examine the resilience of the two different VQA models at scale.
Here we describe the first dataset among the four, which aims at evaluating the resilience of the two VQA models against adversarial examples with different target questionanswer pairs. To this end, we select 3,000 popular questionanswer pairs. In particular, we first remove all answers appearing less than 3 times along with their questions in the VQA training set. This is because we observe that among these least frequent answers, many are simply typos, (e.g., spelling "kitchen" as "kitten"). Therefore, we remove them from consideration.
We consider the top-1000 most frequent questions in the remaining set as popular. Further, for each popular question, we choose its top-3 most frequent answers and consider each corresponding question-answer pair as popular. To ensure each question has at least 3 answers, we also remove all questions with less than 3 answers before selecting the top-1000 most frequent questions.
We are interested in the popular question-answer pairs, because they appear more frequently in the training set, and thus the models may more likely remember these questionanswer pairs. Therefore, we hypothesize that it is more likely to successfully generate an adversarial example with such a target for an irrelevant image. We create this dataset to test this hypothesis. We also randomly select 5 images, which are provided in the top raw of Figure 6 . For each question-answer pair (Q, A) and each image I, we add the triple (I, Q, A) to the Popular-QA set. In the end, there are 15,000 triples in this dataset.
Rare-QA. The second dataset is similar to Popular-QA, but the question-answer pairs are rare. In particular, we filter out the answers appearing less than 3 times, and all questions with less than 3 remaining answers in the same way as during construction of Popular-QA.
Among the remaining questions, we select the top-1000 least frequent ones, and for each of them, we select the three least frequent answers. We consider the question-answer pairs selected by such criteria as rare, and in the end, we have 3,000 rare question-answer pairs. We use the same 5 images as in Popular-QA, and generate a triple using each question-answer pair and each image to construct 15,000 triples which constitute Rare-QA.
In doing so, we can evaluate the resilience of the two VQA models against adversarial examples on both popular question-answer pairs and rare question-answer pairs.
Scale-Image. The third and the fourth datasets are used to evaluate the adversarial generation algorithm's performance across different benign images. To this end, we randomly select five popular question-answer pairs and five rare question-answer pairs, listed in Table 1 , as well as 5,000 images to construct 50,000 triples in total. These triples constitute Scale-Image.
Adversarial example generation algorithms.
In our evaluation, we examine both the attack methods in Carlini et al. [5] and our proposed algorithm. For Carlini's attack, we choose to minimize the loss function:
where x = 255 × (tanh(δ) + 1)/2 to simulate the boxed constraint that each pixel value can only take value from [0, 255] . This approach is demonstrated to be the most effective one in [5] . Here λ is chosen to be 0.1 by a grid search. For our approach, as we discussed in Section 3, we choose the values of hyper-parameters as follows: = 2, λ 1 = 1, λ 2 = 10, η = 1.0, maxitr = 1000. Notice that these hyper-parameters are set based on that each image is represented as a vector of pixel values from [0, 255].
When we generate adversarial examples, we employ the RMSE distance function as used in [30] . In particular, assuming there are two N -dimensional vectors x 1 , x 2 , then the RMSE between the two vectors is computed as
where || · || 2 denotes the L2-norm of a vector. Further, in all experiments, the bound on the distance B is set to be 20. We will demonstrate several adversarial examples to illustrate that the generated adversarial examples are visually similar to their benign counterparts.
Evaluation metrics.
We report two metrics: the attack success rate and the adversarial probability.
Attack success rate. The attack success rate is used to evaluate the overall resilience of a model against an adversarial example generation algorithm. In particular, given an adversarial example I adv and a target question-answer pair (Q target , A target ), the attack is considered successful if f θ (I adv , Q target ) = A target . Then the attack success rate is computed as the percentage of successful attacks over all triples (I adv , Q target , A target ) in a dataset. This is a standard metric used in previous work, e.g., [30] .
Adversarial probability. Assume that the model f θ (I, Q) produces a softmax output J θ (I, Q), which can be considered as a distribution over the label set. That is, J θ (I, Q) i , i.e., the i-th dimension of J θ (I, Q), is the probability of predicting the label i. In this case, given the adversarial example I adv and the target (Q target , A target ), the adversarial probability is computed as J θ (I adv , Q target ) A target . In other words, adversarial probability indicates the confidence score of the model to predict the target answer A target for the input (I adv , Q target ). Different from the attack success rate, which is used to evaluate the overall performance across a set of (I, Q, A) triples, adversarial probability provides a fine-grained metric to inspect the adversarial examples to a single (I, Q, A) triple. The higher the adversarial probability is, the less resilient is a model against the single generated adversarial example.
Quantitative Results
We present the quantitative results in terms of attack success rate and the distribution of adversarial probability for the two VQA models on the datasets defined above.
Gold-Standard. For both models, MCB and NMN, we achieve 100% attack success rate on the Gold-Standard set using all approaches. Note that on the benign images, both models can correctly answer the corresponding questions. The 100% attack success rate of both of the two models shows that both of them are vulnerable to targeted adversarial examples.
We inspect the adversarial probabilities of the generated adversarial examples, and plot the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) in Figure 2 . Note that a lower CDF curve indicates a higher probability in general. From the Figure, we can observe that the CDF curve of NMN is above MCB's, indicating that NMN is slightly more resilient than MCB. However, we can observe that for both models, almost every adversarial example's adversarial probability is above 0.7. Therefore, we conclude that these adversarial examples are very successful at misleading the VQA models to predict the target answers.
Also, from the figure, we observe that the CDF curve of Carlini's attack is much higher than our approach, showing that our approach is more effective at achieving a high adversarial probability. This is because Carlini's attack stops when it successfully generates an adversarial example that can fool the victim model, while our approach will continue until the adversarial probability is maximized.
Popular-QA and Rare-QA. We further investigate VQA adversarial examples across a wide range of target questionanswer pairs. We separately compute the attack success rate using each image as the benign image, and the results are presented in Table 2 . On Popular-QA, the attack success rates are high, i.e., close to 100%, which shows that most adversarial examples can be generated in this set. However, the attack success rates are not perfect, i.e., there exist a few popular target question-answer pairs for which all adversarial example generation algorithms fail at generating targeted adversarial examples. Our investigation reveals that these question-answer pairs' frequencies are among the lowest in the Popular-QA set. Therefore, we hypothesize that the failure is related to the frequencies of the question-answer pairs in the training set. The results on Rare-QA provide further evidence to support this hypothesis. In fact, the attack success rates drop to around 90% − 92%, when the target question-answer pairs are rare. We further investigate our hypothesis in the next section.
Meanwhile, we observe that the attack success rate on both NMN model and the MCB model are similar. On the Rare-QA data set, compared with MCB, NMN is slightly more resilient on Image 1 and 2, but less resilient on Image 3, 4, and 5. To further investigate these two models' resilience against attacks, we also plot the CDF of adversarial probability on Popular-QA and Rare-QA in Figure 3 and Figure 4 respectively. From the plots, we observe that the adversarial probabilities of adversarial examples generated against the NMN model are significantly lower than those generated against the MCB model, especially on Rare-QA. Therefore, we conclude that the NMN model is slightly more resilient than the MCB model especially when the target question-answer pairs are rare.
We also observe that our approach consistently results in a better attack success rate than Carlini's attack. In Table 2 , especially on Rare-QA set, our approach yields 1% − 2% better attack success rate on both models and all images. From Figure 3 and 4, the CDF curves for Carlini's attack are significantly higher than ours. There are two reasons to explain this phenomenon. First, as we discussed above, our approach optimizes the objective until the adversarial probability reaches its maximal, and thus our CDF curves are much lower than Carlini's attack. Second, Carlini's attack prefers to minimize the distortion, while ours finds the best attack as long as the distortion is within a pre-defined bound. In this case, Carlini's attack may miss some opportunity to find those adversarial examples with a slightly larger distortion that can be found by our approach. As we will demonstrate in our qualitative study, these examples are also hard to be identified even by human beings, and thus should be considered as valid adversarial examples. Therefore, we conclude that our proposed attack is more effective than the previous state-of-the-art Carlini's attack at generating adversarial examples. On the other hand, we observe that both attack success rate and adversarial probabilities are consistent regardless of the images chosen to generate adversarial examples. For example, in both Figure 5a and Figure 5b the plot the CDF curves of adversarial probability of adversarial examples generated against the five images respectively using different approaches against different models on different set. We can observe that the CDF curves are very close to each other. Other plots can be found in the appendix, which demonstrate a similar phenomenon. This suggests that the choice of benign images may not have a significant influence on the attack success rate. To further examine this hypothesis, we compute the percentage of target question-answer pairs for which adversarial examples can be generated from n out of the 5 benign images. For brevity we refer to this as "the question-answer pair can attack n images". This result is shown in Table 3 . From the table, we can observe that the majority of the question-answer pairs, e.g., over 85% of the question-answer pairs, can attack either 0 or 5 images. That is, if an adversarial example for a target question-answer pair can be generated from one benign image, then it can also be generated from another benign image with high probability; or otherwise, no adversarial example can be generated for this target. The third highest values appear for n = 4. That is, those target question-answer pairs can attack 4 out of 5 benign images, but leaving one as a failure. We observe the target question-answer pairs that can attack only 1, 2, or 3 out of 5 images are very few. Therefore, all these experiments suggest that whether adversarial examples can successfully mislead the model is more relevant to the target question-answer pair, and less relevant to the benign image.
Scale-Image. We further test the hypothesis that "the attack success rate is less relevant to the benign images" using the Scale-Image dataset. In our evaluation, we observe that for all 25,000 triples (I, Q, A), where (Q, A) are popular (see Table 1 , "Popular-Image question-answer pairs"), the attack success rate is 100%. On the rare QA pairs, however, we observe an interesting phenomenon (see Table 1 , "Rare-Image question-answer pairs"). MCB can not be fooled to predict the target answer for QA4 (Why is the girl standing in the middle of the room with an object in each hand? [playing wii]) for any image, and predicts "yes" instead for most adversarial examples. At the same time, NMN can not be fooled to predict the target answer for QA5 (Who manufactured this plane? [japan]) for any but 1 adversarial image, and it predicts "china" instead for most remaining adversarial examples. These results further confirm our hypothesis, i.e. that the choice of question-answer pairs is more important than the choice of benign images for the attack's success. Figure 6 presents some qualitative results from our experiments on the Rare-QA pairs. We provide both benign images and adversarial examples generated against MCB and NMN. We observe that it is hard to distinguish the benign images from adversarial ones visually.
Qualitative Study
We show the highest predictions of both VQA models on the benign images (top) and on the adversarial examples generated for the target QA pairs (bottom). We show targets in "[]" and highlight the failed attacks in italics. First, we note that even for the questions irrelevant to the images, initially, both VQA models can make reasonable predictions. We then review the models' behavior on the adversarial examples. We observe that the MCB model is more frequently fooled by the adversaries than the NMN model, for instance in the case of the first question. For the second question both models predict "left" instead of the target "to left", so essentially the attack succeeds, but it is counted as a failure case. Therefore, our quantitative results provide an overconservative estimation on the attack success rate. Finally, for the third question all the attacks fail, and top predictions such as "yes" indicate the models' confusion. Interestingly, NMN model predicts "military" instead of "navy" for Image 2, which can also be counted as a success case.
What makes the attacks successful?
We conduct further qualitative studies to understand why the attack success rate is high, e.g., on the Gold-Standard set. In particular, both models in our study employ attention mechanisms. That is, to answer a question, a model first computes an attention map, which is a weight distribution over each pixel in the image, based on the image and the question. Intuitively, a well-performed model should put more weight, i.e. attend to, the image region that is most informative to answer the question. We demonstrate the attention maps for three benign images from the Gold-Standard set and their adversarial counterparts in Table 4 . We observe that in most cases the adversarial examples mislead the VQA models to not focus on the regions that allow to answer the question correctly. In particular, in the traffic sign example, in the benign images both MCB and NMN focus on the stop sign when answering the question. The adversarial examples fool both MCB and NMN to pay attention to the street sign instead, which leads to predicting a one-way traffic sign, likely because both signs are long rectangular metal plates. Therefore, from these examples, we observe that adversarial examples can fool both the attention component and the classification component of the VQA models to achieve the malicious goal.
Transferability
We also test the transferability of the generated adversarial examples between MCB and NMN. We use the Gold-Standard set to generate adversarial examples for this evaluation. We find that 79 out of 100 adversarial examples generated for the MCB model can transfer to NMN, while the number is 60 in the other direction. This shows that adversarial examples on VQA models can transfer well, and thus opens the door for black-box attacks.
Notice that in existing work [30] , Liu et al. demonstrate that it is non-trivial to generate transferable targeted adversarial examples from a single image classification model. We note that both MCB and NMN employ the same pretrained ResNet-152 features [15] as their image representation. Thus, we attribute the good transferability results to the use of ResNet-152 in both models.
Understanding Hard Targets for Generating Adversarial Examples
While we observe that adversarial examples can be generated for most target question-answer pairs, in some cases the adversarial generation algorithm fails. We notice that whether the attack will succeed or not depends on the target question-answer pair rather than on the benign image. In this section, we investigate the failure cases and provide some insights into why some targeted attacks may be hard.
The effectiveness of language priors
As we have observed in the experimental results described in Section 4, whether a question-answer pair is a hard target depends more on the question-answer pair itself and less on the image. Therefore, we hypothesize that the language component in the VQA models may prevent adversarial examples to fool the models with certain targets. This phenomenon can be considered the language priors of VQA models. That is, given a question, if the model is less likely to predict a certain answer, we are also less likely to Figure 7a and Figure 7b show that the answer frequency is positively correlated with the adversarial probability on MCB and NMN respectively. Figure 7c shows the answer frequency of the MCB model and the NMN model. successfully generate targeted adversarial examples using it as the target answer.
In this section, we evaluate this phenomenon to verify our hypothesis. In particular, we choose a question, "What sport is this?". We first evaluate the answer frequency as follows. We run the VQA model on each of the 5,000 images in the VQA validation set and the selected question to get 5,000 answers. We compute the frequency of each answer in this set.
Intuitively, the answer frequency is a Monte-Carlo simulation of the answer distribution of the VQA model, and our goal is to examine the relationship between the answer distribution and the success of using an answer as the target to generate adversarial examples. In particular, we want to show that the answer frequency is positively correlated with the adversarial probability for each answer. To this end, we sequentially set each answer as the target answer, while setting the question chosen above (i.e., "what sport is this") as the target question, and Image 1 in Figure 6 as the benign image. Then we compute the adversarial probability of each answer. We sort all the answers in the descending order of their adversarial probabilities, and jointly plot the adversarial probabilities and the answer frequencies. Figures 7a and 7b show the corresponding plots for MCB and NMN. In these plots, each point in the x-axis indicates a label of an answer, so that the answer with the highest adversarial probability is labeled as 0, and so on. The blue line plots the adversarial probability of all answers, while the red dots plot the answer frequency. We only plot the answers whose frequency is at least 1, namely the answers must appear in the model's prediction set.
From both figures, we can observe a clear relationship between the answer frequency and the adversarial probability. That is, all answers with a frequency of 1 and higher can be predicted with a large probability (e.g., > 0.1), and all these answers can be used as targets to generate adversarial examples. Further, we observe that the answer frequency loosely aligns with the adversarial probability. This observation supports our hypothesis that the answer frequency is positively correlated with the adversarial probability.
Further, we observe that NMN has fewer answers with a positive frequency. We illustrate this phenomenon in Figure 7c . In this figure, we sort all answers in the descending order of their frequencies based on the NMN model, and the x-axis corresponds to their rank. The blue plot shows the distribution of the answer frequency computed based on the NMN model, while the orange dots are each answer's frequency computed based on the MCB model. We can observe that many answers have a large frequency based on the MCB model, but their frequency based on the NMN model is 0. Therefore, combined with the observation above, this demonstrates that the NMN model has a smaller range of answers that can be used as the target to generate adversarial examples than the MCB model. Notice that all these answers are generated based on the same questions. We investigate the results, and find that many of the answers predicted by the MCB model are irrelevant to the question used in this evaluation. This shows that, since NMN composes the network modules according to the input question, it is more effective at constructing corresponding filter modules, which can eliminate the answers irrelevant to the question. On the other hand, the MCB model does not have this functionality, since its architecture is identical throughout all questions. Therefore, when an image is less relevant to the question, the MCB model may predict answers considering more about the image than the question. In this sense, the answer set of NMN is smaller than the one of MCB, since the former only includes answers relevant to the question. This also indicates that NMN has a stronger language prior than MCB, which partially explains why NMN behaves slightly more resilient than MCB in our previous experiments.
Meaningless question-answer targets
We further evaluate the effect of language prior by constructing a dataset of meaningless question-answer targets. Notice that in all experiments in Section 4, we choose question-answer pairs from the VQA's validation set, and thus the answers are likely meaningful to the questions. In this experiment, we select 100 questions from 5 categories starting with (1) "What color"; (2) "What animal"; (3) "Is";
(4) "How many"; and (5) "Where". Then we construct the set of meaningful answers to each type of questions: for example, "silver" is a meaningful answer to a "what color" question. In doing so, the answer assigned to one type of question is guaranteed to be meaningless to the questions in another type. Thus we choose a meaningless answer for each of the 100 questions. We use them as targets and the 5 images used in Popular-QA and Rare-QA as the benign images to generate the adversarial examples. In the end, we observe that the attack success rates using our approach against MCB and NMN are only 7.8% and 4.6% respectively; the corresponding numbers for Carlini's attack are 6.8% and 3.8% respectively. This experiment further confirms the significance of the language prior and again demonstrates that NMN is more resilient against adversarial examples than MCB.
Related Work
Visual Question Answering. The first neural models for visual question answering were largely inspired by image captioning approaches, e.g. relying on CNN for image encoding and RNN for question encoding [34] , [45] , [10] . Some approaches alternatively applied CNN for question representation [32] . Inspired by [56] who proposed to use spatial attention for image captioning, a large number of works have adopted it to VQA [9] , [59] , [46] , [55] , [31] , [57] . Semantic attention has been explored by [58] . Other directions explored by recent work include Dynamic Memory Networks (DMN) [26] , [54] , and dynamic parameter layer (DPP) [39] . Recently a new line of work focused on developing more compositional approaches to VQA, namely neural module networks [2] , [1] , [18] . These approaches have shown a strong advantage over the prior work in the visual questions which involve complex reasoning, such as in the CLEVR dataset [21] . A few recent works have proposed to extract more information from the question, such as the question type [22] or integrating additional attention mechanism over the question [31] . Some works argue that to successfully address VQA tasks one requires common sense knowledge which can be obtained from external knowledge bases [52] , [51] . Moreover, [51] additionally generate human understandable reasons, or explanations, that justify the predicted answers.
Adversarial examples. Recent works have pointed out that deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples, which are inputs that are slightly different from the original ones but are classified wrongly by the deep architectures [48] , [13] . There are two lines of research studying this topic; one is adversarial example generation, the other is the defense against adversarial examples. In the following, we review existing work on both sides.
Existing works on adversarial example generation mainly focus on image classification models. Several different approaches have been proposed for generating adversarial examples, including fast gradient-based methods [13] , [30] , optimization-based methods [48] , [5] , and others [42] , [38] . In particular, Carlini et al. demonstrate that optimization-based approaches can generate adversarial examples with very small perturbation added to the original inputs, while the resulted inputs could still be predicted wrongly by the deep neural network [5] .
Recent works show that adversarial examples can transfer between different deep neural networks for image classification [48] , [13] , [30] , [40] . Such a property of adversarial examples is called transferability, which is first demonstrated in [48] . Papernot examples, which means that the generated perturbation can not only transfer across different models but also across different input images [37] . Meanwhile, to explain the transferability of adversarial examples, several works have investigated the decision boundaries of the deep neural networks, and they give some explanation based on their experimental findings and theoretical analysis [13] , [30] , [37] , [50] .
While most previous works focus on image classification models, a new line of research studies adversarial examples against deep neural networks for other tasks, such as recurrent neural networks for text processing [43] , [20] , deep reinforcement learning models for game playing [29] , [19] , [24] , semantic segmentation [8] , [53] , and object detection [53] . To our best knowledge, our work is the first to study adversarial examples against vision-language models. Further, unlike most previous work, we focus on targeted adversarial examples, which are much harder to generate compared to non-targeted ones.
Defense against Adversarial Examples. On the defense side, numerous defense strategies have been proposed against adversarial examples [13] , [44] , [36] . We introduce some widely studied strategies below.
A line of research studies adversarial training, where the generated adversarial examples are added into the training set, so that besides learning the correct predictions for the original training set, the model learns to predict these adversarial examples correctly as well [13] , [27] , [49] , [33] . These works show that adversarial training helps to make better predictions on adversarial examples generated against the original model, i.e., the model trained without adversarial examples. Further, Madry et al. demonstrate that using adversarial examples generated with their method to train a model for the MNIST dataset, their model can even defend against white-box adversarial examples [33] . However, in general, current adversarial training methods still cannot defend against white-box adversarial examples well. Madry et al. show that their adversarial training method is much less effective for CIFAR-10 models than MNIST ones [33] .
Other works aim to distinguish adversarial examples and normal inputs. Grosse et al. study the effectiveness of statistical tests for adversarial example detection [14] . Although they observe that adversarial examples are not drawn from the same distribution as the natural inputs, they can only detect the existence of adversarial examples when the test set includes a sufficiently large number of adversarial examples, and they can not tell whether a certain input is adversarial or not. To mitigate this issue, another approach of detecting the adversarial examples is to augment the neural networks with a detector network [36] , [14] , [12] , [7] . However, He et al. show that when the adversary has knowledge of the detector network, he can generate adversarial examples that can mislead the model, while still bypassing the detector [16] .
Some recent works study ensembles of different models and defense strategies to see whether that helps to increase the robustness of deep neural networks [49] , [35] . These works show that the ensemble method can better defend against a weak adversary that does not have full knowledge of the ensemble; in particular, Tramer et al. show that training with adversarial examples transferred from other models can significantly decrease the transferability of adversarial examples [49] . However, again, adversarial examples can still be successfully generated when the adversary has full knowledge of the models and the defense strategies used in the ensemble [50] , [16] .
In addition, Papernot et al. propose to adapt distillation, a technique for model compressing, for defense against adversarial examples [44] . However, Carlini et al. propose an approach to generate adversarial examples that distillation fails to defend against [4] .
Conclusion
In this work, we have presented an extensive study of adversarial attacks for visual question answering. We first present a new threat model to show that when generating adversarial examples, the attacker should not only maximize the attack success rate, but also should maximize the adversarial probability and thus minimize the likelihood of being detected. Following this threat model, we design a new attack approach, which demonstrates a better performance than the previous state-of-the-art Carlini's attack.
Using our best attack approach, we study two state-ofthe-art VQA models, a non-compositional one MCB and a compositional one NMN. We find that both these models are easy to attack, and the adversarial examples generated against one model can transfer to the other. These results show that adversarial examples pose real threats to not only image classification models, but also more complicated VQA models.
On the other hand, we observe that neither approach in our evaluation can achieve a 100% attack success rate, especially when the question-answer pairs are rare in the training set. We further investigate this issue, and reveal that language prior may be the reason attributing to this phenomenon. Our evaluation also demonstrates that NMN is slightly more resilient than MCB, showing that a compositional model may provide more robustness against adver 
